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Abstract 
Arild Underdal has been at the center of an important community of scholars studying global environmental 
governance. Since the 1990s that community, along with many other scholars globally, has offered important insights 
into the design and management of international institutions that can lead to more effective management of 
environmental problems. At the same time, diplomats have made multiple attempts to create institutions to manage 
the dangers of climate change. This essay looks at what has been learned by both communities—scholars and 
practitioners—as their efforts co-evolved. It appears that despite a wealth of possible insights into making cooperation 
effective very few of the lessons offered by scholars had much impact during the first two decades of climate change 
diplomacy. Indeed, basic concepts from cooperation theory and evidence from case studies—many developed in Arild’s 
orbit—can explain why those two decades achieved very little real cooperation. The new Paris agreement may be 
changing all that and much better reflects insights from scholars about how to build effective international institutions. 
Success in the Paris process is far from assured and scholars can contribute a lot more with a more strategic view of 
when and how they have an impact. 
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1. Introduction 
From the early 1990s a large and growing community of 
scholars interested in the effectiveness of international 
cooperation has been orbiting around Arild Underdal. I 
consider myself one of the orbiters, dating from our 
joint work at the International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis (IIASA) and from many projects since.  
Many other scholars have created their own orbits 
as well, and most of us have found ourselves circling 
many planets. But Arild’s gravitational force has been 
intellectually strong for at least two reasons. One is 
that the Underdalian solar system has now been 
around and productive for a long time—perhaps longer 
than any other sustained research program on interna-
tional environmental governance. Arild’s planets have 
multiplied and colonized globally. The other is that Ar-
ild has held firm with a beautiful ascetic approach to 
theory. Whenever complex environmental issues are at 
stake it is easy to identify hundreds of variable and 
causal mechanisms that may be at work. But starting 
with Arild’s work on fisheries (Underdal, 1980) where 
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the core, important variables were the numbers of 
players in a negotiation and conflicts in their prefer-
ences—one of his intellectual gravitational forces has 
been a focus on what matters most.  
In parallel with the emergence of a global research 
program on environmental governance the world’s dip-
lomats have also tried their hand at governance. What 
can be learned from the parallel efforts at scholarship 
and practice? Have the diplomats learned anything 
from the community of scholars who are studying sys-
tematically the business of diplomacy? Have the schol-
ars learned anything from the diplomats?  
In this essay—which is more of a thinkpiece than a 
tightly wound set of hypotheses tested with data—I aim 
to offer some answers to those questions. My focus is 
on the problem of global climate change—one that was 
just taking shape as a serious global problem around the 
same time that numerous research programs aimed at 
studying global governance were getting started in the 
early 1990s. Climate change is a good case for looking at 
whether theory and practice learn from each other be-
cause the problem itself has a deeply malign structure—
serious solutions require sustained cooperation over 
many decades with strong incentives to defect (Keohane 
& Victor, 2016). And precisely because of that malign 
structure, diplomatic efforts have been ongoing for 
many decades with, at best, mixed results.  
I’ll look at these questions from three perspectives. 
First, and briefly, what’s gone wrong in the first two 
decades of multilateral cooperation? Second, what’s 
new in the current efforts under the Paris accord—and 
why are these new efforts so promising after decades 
of gridlock and inaction? Third, what have we learned 
from all this for the study and practice of global envi-
ronmental governance.  
2. What Went Wrong with Global Cooperation on 
Climate Change? 
A decade ago many of us in Arild’s orbit took stock of 
what he had taught us. At that time, I wrote about the 
lessons learned from Arild’s research for global climate 
change (Victor, 2006). At that time, my task was that of 
an intellectual coroner—probing why efforts to pro-
mote cooperation on climate change had, so far, 
achieved almost nothing. My assessment then still 
holds today, and it comes straight from work done in 
the Underdalian solar system.  
Global efforts to address climate change were at-
tempting to involve all nations on the planet in the 
crafting of universal agreements that would be legally 
binding. The inflexibility of binding law—backed by 
strict emission targets and timetables—was seen by 
many policy makers as a virtue because that would 
guarantee, they thought, that all nations’ feet would be 
held to the fire. And the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) operated as a 
monopoly—it was the only forum for talking about 
multilateral actions on climate change.  
It was not hard—from basic theory as well as the 
accumulated insights from research on the effective-
ness of international environmental cooperation—to 
predict that this system would fail. Indeed, all the 
warning signs were found in the work of Underdal and 
his colleagues, among others. As I see it, the existing 
social scientific research on the effectiveness of interna-
tional environmental agreements offered three warning 
signs to the architects of climate change diplomacy. And 
on all three of these warning signs the policymakers ba-
sically ignored everything we had to say. 
First, a universal agreement amongst countries with 
wildly different preferences would be fantastically dif-
ficult to achieve. Indeed, success would be possible on-
ly by watering down the content to reflect the interests 
of the least ambitious actors (Underdal, 1980)—a 
strategy reflected in the UNFCCC itself. Or the partici-
pants could be narrowed to just a subset of supposedly 
more ambitious actors—as was done in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol—but that strategy would not work for the long 
term since most growth in emissions was from the 
other, excluded nations (Victor, 2001). Or, as in Copen-
hagen, gridlock would emerge.  
A second warning sign concerned flexibility. An 
agreement that offered very little flexibility was also 
likely to yield the lowest common denominator or grid-
lock. As a practical matter, the question of flexibility 
arose most centrally around the policy decision of 
whether to make international agreements on climate 
change legally binding. Many of Arild’s students who 
were engaged in the IIASA project in the 1990s were 
working on this question; my read of their research is 
an unambiguous endorsement for the merits of non-
binding agreements under special circumstances. I 
learned a lot, in particular, from research on the Euro-
pean acid rain regime which showed that binding 
commitments made countries wary about offering 
commitments that they weren't sure they could honor, 
but nonbinding commitments allowed them to offer 
“stretch” goals there were often very important (Wet-
testad, 1998). Research on the North Sea regime came 
to a similar conclusion, with the added insight that a 
regular set of high-level conferences backed by imple-
mentation review could turn those stretch goals into 
pragmatic action plans that governments would actually 
follow (Skjærseth, 1998). Implementation review helped 
keep governments accountable for their commitments 
and forced them to explain when they fell short—as of-
ten happened when governments adopted stretch goals. 
Across a wide array of other case studies, we saw similar 
patterns in our research, with a pretty clear trade-off be-
tween the legal status of an agreement and the possible 
impacts of that agreement on how countries managed 
very complex environmental problems (Victor, Raustiala, 
& Skolnikoff, 1998). Since then, scholars working on 
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similar topics have developed a more systematic set of 
insights around the relationship between hard law and 
soft law (Abbott & Snidal, 2000).  
The third warning sign was not so crisply developed 
in the 1990s when we were all working together at 
IIASA, although the elements of what has become a 
very interesting research program were beginning to 
take shape. Looking across many international envi-
ronmental agreements, it is striking that some are 
highly integrated and centralized. The Montréal proto-
col on the ozone layer is a good example. Many others, 
however, are much more decentralized.  
Working in the 1990s as part of the IIASA research 
project, I became interested in how governments were 
crafting international agreements on plant genetic re-
sources. This is an area where governments and firms 
and NGOs all were trying to get things done, but no-
body could agree on exactly the right course of action. 
Plant genetic resources were also intrinsically decen-
tralized, as they implicate the international trade re-
gime, many environmental regimes, and the industrial 
structure of important yet diverse industries. Decen-
tralization in the legal regime helped these many di-
verse actors and institutions experiment with different 
ideas and figure out what works. The paper that came 
out about activity called these decentralized regulatory 
systems a “regime complex” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004). 
Other people have applied other concepts to the same 
idea, notably Lin Ostrom’s work on “polycentrism” 
(Ostrom, 2009). When I look back on that period I real-
ize that we were grappling with the issues of decentrali-
zation and experimentation in many other areas of envi-
ronmental regulation as well, such as whaling and 
protection of the oceans (Andresen, 1998; Stokke, 
1998). Certainly I would not have been working on the 
idea of regime complexes if it had not been for the joint 
research with Arild in his solar system in the 1990s. 
Certainly others will look back on the history of the 
first two decades of international diplomacy on the cli-
mate change issue and come to other conclusions. But 
when I look back on it what I see is a growing array of in-
sights about how to make international cooperation on 
difficult topics such as more highly effective, and no rela-
tionship between those insights and what the diplomats 
were actually doing. What's different about the Paris 
approach is that it is much more reflective of some of 
the fundamental insights about bargaining, starting with 
the merits of allowing small groups to work on problems 
rather than just big universal agreements. That's an in-
sight that I many others first learned from Arild. 
3. Why Was Paris Different1 
Why did Paris work when almost everything before it 
failed? Here I’d like to offer some answers to that 
                                                          
1 See Victor (2015). This section draws largely from that piece. 
question and then explore how we academics who 
have been in Arild’s orbit might help the Paris process 
become more effective.  
My answer to the question of why Paris “worked” 
lies centrally with how commitments are being negoti-
ated in the Paris process. Instead of setting commit-
ments through centralized bargaining, the Paris ap-
proach lets countries set their own commitments. 
These “nationally determined contributions” are a 
starting point for deeper cooperation that will unfold 
over time. Once the Paris agreement enters into force 
and is fully in motion each nation will be expected to 
adopt a new pledge every 5 years in tandem with peri-
odic overall efforts to take stock of how the group of 
nations is doing.  
The flexibility of this pledge-and-review system 
helped transform climate diplomacy from the gridlock 
and impotence of the past. It makes it easier for na-
tional governments to tailor their commitments to 
what they know they can deliver at home. Frankly, 
most of the world’s emissions come from countries 
that aren’t centrally worried (yet) about global climate 
change. Take China, the world’s biggest emitter. Its 
leaders have learned more about the dangers of un-
checked climate warming, and that has made the coun-
try a bit more willing to act. But the nation still has other 
much more pressing priorities—like clearing the urban 
air of smog. Or India, another big emitter, which is also 
mainly focused on priorities other than global warming, 
such as making the nation’s power grid more reliable.  
The pledging approach lets these countries offer 
packages of policies that align with their self-interests 
while also doing something to slow the growth of glob-
al climate pollution. The same is true of most of the 
United States—outside the environmentally conscious 
coastal states, most of the nation is not centrally seized 
by fear of global climate change. When asked general 
questions by pollsters about climate change most Amer-
icans say they believe the science, but the best polling 
shows that people still aren’t willing to spend much to 
combat this global problem (e.g., Ansolabehere & 
Konisky, 2014). One of the reasons that past efforts to 
address this problem failed is that they were orches-
trated around the idea that fixing global warming re-
quires a treaty focused on strict limits on emissions of 
greenhouse gases. The new approach, by contrast, is 
organized around the idea that every country has its 
own national interests and needs the flexibility to align 
what it does globally with what is doable locally.  
Eventually a much more integrated global treaty 
will be needed to make major cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions—one directly focused on the global goals. 
But flexibility offers a way to get started and build con-
fidence that, in time, will beget more confidence and a 
willingness to do more. This is the same theory—with a 
similar dose of flexibility—that guided the creation of 
the highly effective system for international coordina-
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tion of trade policy through the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and since 1995 the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Trade diplomacy began in 
the 1940s with simple, self-enforcing agreements that 
aligned with national interests; through successive 
rounds of bargaining those national policies were 
ratcheted forward and integrated. Easier problems were 
tackled first, building confidence that made it possible to 
tackle harder diplomatic challenges. The Paris agree-
ment is intended to move the world in that direction.  
There were many other sources of flexibility that al-
so helped. Much of what was agreed in Paris, including 
notably the national pledges, is not strictly binding. 
Quite apart from whether the concept of binding in-
ternational law is an oxymoron, the nonbinding status 
of commitments has been liberating for the reasons 
that academics already understood in the 1990s. There 
is a tradeoff between the rigor of the legal commit-
ments and the level of ambition that countries are will-
ing to offer, especially when governments are highly 
unsure about exactly what is feasible for them to im-
plement at home  
Another source of flexibility was the fact that many 
countries, long before Paris, were already working on 
the climate problem in smaller groups outside the 
United Nations. There were small groups of countries 
focused on forests—the area where the most progress 
in cutting emissions has been made in recent years. 
Other groups worked on the Arctic. Still others, with 
overlapping membership, are making tangible progress 
in cutting short-lived climate pollutants, such as soot 
and methane. There has been striking progress in regu-
lating powerful heat trapping gases through the Mon-
treal Protocol. Norway’s role in all this is worth men-
tioning, in particular. There is no “small” country that 
has done more to advance cooperation on climate 
change than Norway.  
All this flexibility didn’t clear the political land mines 
of past efforts to cooperate on climate change. The 
least developed and most vulnerable countries in Paris 
were still rightly concerned that they get special treat-
ment since they are bearing the brunt of climate impacts 
that they did not cause. The oil exporting countries, led 
by Saudi Arabia, still appear keen to make this agree-
ment as ineffective as possible, since success could spell 
trouble for their lifeblood. These landmines sit armed 
and ready to explode at every large diplomatic meeting 
on climate change; flexibility makes it a bit easier to 
keep them from blowing up the whole process.  
Division of the world into developed and develop-
ing countries—a concept enshrined in the 1992 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and a regu-
lar feature of most modern global environmental 
agreements—cast a shadow over almost every discus-
sion in Paris, since developing countries are deter-
mined to see developed nations bear most of the cost. 
But flexible pledges meant that nations from both sides 
of the divide could continue to hold their views about 
the right ways to categorize countries even though the 
categories are increasingly meaningless. The emer-
gence of rapidly growing “middle-income” countries—
such as China, Brazil, and Korea—has changed the facts 
on the ground. The world has moved on, and the flexi-
bility in the Paris process has made it easier for climate 
diplomacy to reflect those realities.  
This shift from an integrated “top down” style of 
climate bargaining to a more flexible pledge and review 
system has its roots, in part, in academic thinking—
including the work that began in Paris. However, there 
were many other handmaidens of success in Paris, es-
pecially the French hosts who made success a national 
priority. They adopted a strategy for success—one that 
revolved around flexibility rather than trying to shoe-
horn a lot of complex bargaining into a single, central-
ized binding agreement—but they also backed that 
strategy with massive diplomatic resources. They had a 
realistic sense of what was feasible along with a plan B 
(and plans that ran deeper in the alphabet) in case 
things turned sour. They as diplomatic hosts were well 
integrated with the climate change secretariat, which al-
so had a sober vision for what was feasible as a pragmat-
ic strategy for obtaining that outcome. The contrast with 
the Danish hosts and the secretariat that managed the 
Copenhagen process could not have been starker.  
Good hosting by the French helped to build good 
will—and focused minds on the harmful consequences 
of failure—and that was on display in many ways. A deal 
on climate finance—which in Copenhagen had been set 
at $100 billion per year of new money by 2020—could 
have easily blown up the talks, with both donors and re-
cipients having strong incentives to hold out for the best 
deal. Good will and the costs to all sides from failure 
helped focus minds on an agreement that did little be-
yond what was already happening—with $100 billion 
per year as the floor for new money. All the details that 
would make these commitments workable, such as ac-
counting systems, were pushed into the future.  
To be sure, some of the bargaining behaviors that 
have plagued international climate agreements in the 
past were still on display. One was revealed by the so-
called “ambition coalition”—a big group of nations that 
pretended to seek the most ambitious agreement pos-
sible when, in fact, little held them together except 
slogans. This coalition favored strong language around 
the goal of stopping warming at well below 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels, ideally at 1.5 de-
grees. Looking at the feasibility of these goals was one 
of the tasks of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) panel on which I served for the last five 
years. That experience convinced me that warming 
probably can’t be stopped at those levels—the world 
has dithered for too long and must now brace for the 
consequences. Even a realistic crash program to cut 
emissions will blow through 2 degrees; 1.5 degrees is 
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ridiculous. New goals are needed (Briggs, Kennel, & 
Victor, 2015).  
As academics, we need to avoid getting sucked into 
diplomatic debates that are, by design, fruitless. A 
flood of papers is being written about the Paris goals, 
and now that the IPCC has agreed to write a special re-
port on 1.5 degrees even more papers will be written 
with the aim of being cited in that report. But the goals 
demanded by the “ambition coalition” have not been 
achievable for some time. Yet nobody within the offi-
cial process has an incentive to state the truth about 
what is achievable because no single country is account-
able for reaching these bold collective goals. Even in the 
IPCC, which should have been speaking truth to policy in 
its final Summary for Policy Makers, has no blunt state-
ments about the impracticality of these goals (Edenhofer 
et al., 2014). That’s because the IPCC’s summary, like the 
Paris Agreement itself, is approved essentially by con-
sensus—a method for making decisions that favors 
oblique language and a high ratio of bold pronounce-
ments to practical realities. Yet the truth matters, be-
cause this agreement is now organized around goals 
that are not achievable, which will make the periodic 
stocktaking difficult to do with honesty. It will also make 
it harder for policy makers to put the needed focus on 
the huge needs for adaptation that are on the horizon.  
On balance, all of this is encouraging news. A new 
process is under way, and it has many of the elements 
of success. What can we as academics do to help?  
We in the academic community need to avoid get-
ting drawn into debates that are structurally fruitless. 
But we should let ourselves play a bigger role in other 
aspects of the Paris process where hard-nosed social 
science of the Underdalian type is badly needed. Let 
me highlight two.  
One is the question of how nations will actually 
know what each other is doing. Early in the planning 
process for the IIASA project we focused on this topic—
on what arms controllers called “verification”—as an 
area where more research was needed. Our advisors, 
such as Arild, guided us to research that would help 
explain the incentives for cooperation. And absent veri-
fication and eventually enforcement systems there 
were many kinds of malign problems for which cooper-
ation would be impossible.  
That logic now applies to climate change. Pledge and 
review is a long overdue way to get started with cooper-
ation, but making that cooperation much deeper—with 
much costlier controls on emissions—will require the 
ability to assess whether each nation is doing its part 
and to link together the different national efforts into a 
more integrated, collaborative set of international 
agreements. Most of the details for how that will be 
done were deferred in Paris, and fleshing out a system 
for transparency is one reason why most observers think 
the “after Paris” process will be more important than 
the Paris meeting itself. Getting consensus on a serious 
review mechanism is all but impossible, which is why it 
will be important for some countries to volunteer them-
selves for careful review—to lead the way. A good mod-
el for this lies in the systems of ambitious commitments 
backed by implementation review that the IIASA team 
studied in the North Sea and other locales.  
A robust review system would create much higher 
levels of transparency. That, in turn, could lower the 
transaction costs for more complicated and detailed in-
tegrated agreements. We in the social science commu-
nity should develop some insights and predictions for 
exactly when and how those expectations will actually 
be realized.  
Political scientists need to get more centrally in-
volved in the debate about the role of markets in creat-
ing incentives to deepen international cooperation af-
ter Paris. Already many analysts are excited by what 
they see in Article 6 of the Paris agreement, which in-
cludes the provision for “internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes,” a clunky concept that surely will 
become known as ITMOs in the acronym riddled world 
of climate diplomacy. For many economists, ITMOs will 
be seen as an open door for international trading of 
emission credits—a concept that, in theory, could link 
national policy schemes into a more efficient, integrat-
ed global effort. From the first paper I wrote on this 
topic in the late 1980s I have been skeptical that inter-
national emission trading systems will work well be-
cause creating carbon credits is like creating a new form 
of money—a money that is only as good as the institu-
tions that back it (Victor, 2009; Victor et al., 2014). Even 
in highly developed countries that is hard to do, a point 
that the Greek debt crisis has underscored for the Euro. 
Whether and how international trading will really work 
is an ongoing debate among analysts, and I expect that 
debate will now move into higher gear. This question of 
how different national regulatory and market systems 
will become interconnected over time—which will be 
essential to creating a more integrated approach to 
deep decarbonizaiton that eventually affects the whole 
world economy—is pivotal to the success of Paris. And it 
is an area where social science theory and empirical re-
search have a lot to contribute.  
Eventually, these efforts at building transparency 
will become a verification system—a topic that hasn't 
received much attention in most international envi-
ronmental agreements where diplomats seem almost 
scared to talk about verification and enforcement, in 
contrast with arms control diplomacy where these top-
ics usually occupy center stage (Ausubel & Victor, 
1992). Within the Paris process, where consensus is re-
quired, verification is a dirty word. Outside Paris, how-
ever, many countries, firms and NGOs are building the 
technologies—including satellite systems—that will be 
needed to make verification a reality. These facts on 
the ground will matter a lot more than the legal lan-
guage in global agreements. Inside the Paris meeting 
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halls the United States argued vehemently against 
strict monitoring and verification systems because it 
did not want the encumbrances of a global treaty. Up 
in space, however, the U.S. and other space leaders 
such as the European Space Agency are already testing 
the elements of a robust satellite monitoring system.  
I don’t see how robust new systems for review and 
verification will emerge from the global forum of the 
United Nations. More interesting, however, is the pro-
spect for cooperation emerging in smaller groups—
“clubs.” Once again, Arild colleagues are helping to 
show the way and steer other scholars to this im-
portant topic. Their work is aimed at trying to under-
stand how different configurations of clubs can lead to 
deeper cooperation as well as the configurations that 
might get stuck with shallow cooperation (Hovi, Sprinz, 
Sælen, & Underdal, 2016). A central issue will be the 
incentive structures and institutions for delivering pen-
alties and rewards (Sælen, 2015). 
The other area where the academic community 
could become more engaged with the after Paris pro-
cess concerns the machinery of institutional design. 
Fundamentally, most of research on environmental co-
operation in the Underdalian orbit has been institu-
tional. It has been focused on how institutions can help 
decentralized parties realize collective interests. Look-
ing to the future, this kind of research remains crucially 
important and will take us ever closer into collabora-
tion with scholars in other disciplines, such as law.  
For example, consider the topic of what interna-
tional lawyers call “entry into force.” Ambitious agree-
ments usually don't enter into force automatically. 
Countries must sign and ratify them to signal that they, 
individually, will adhere. In addition, a big-enough 
group must join so that the agreement, as a whole, is 
triggered. In serious agreements, these triggers serve 
an important function: to prevent a nation that goes 
first with ratification from getting stuck inside an 
agreement when its competitors stay outside and gain 
advantages from free riding. In arms control diplomacy 
these provisions were the stuff of high politics, with ex-
tremely sophisticated entry-into-force provisions.  
The entry-into-force trigger in Paris is anything but 
sophisticated. It simply requires ratification by 55 
countries accounting for 55 percent of world emis-
sions. Meeting those thresholds will be easy—
especially the country trigger since there are already 
more than a 100 countries immediately eager and will-
ing to sign and ratify. That threshold gives no small 
group the ability to block the agreement. Countries like 
Saudi Arabia and Russia, which are in the carbon-
exporting business, account for only one-tenth of 
world emissions, so they alone can’t be spoilers.2 All 
                                                          
2 My calculations on the most recent set of 2012 emissions da-
ta from EDGAR, probably the most reliable source with global 
coverage of all warming pollutants. Also see Olivier, Janssens-
the richest industrialized countries (about one-quarter 
of world emissions) won’t be enough to bring the trea-
ty into force. Even if those countries team up with the 
poorest countries, including the vulnerable low-lying is-
land nations, they can’t reliably cross the 55 percent 
threshold. And if just one big nation is flaky—say, the 
United States, where the fate of the agreement is hard-
ly certain—then that group certainly falls short.3  
Ultimately, the “middle-income” countries will be 
the king-makers. They, led by China (23 percent of 
global emissions), account in total for about 37 percent 
of world emissions. Even the U.S. and China, together, 
can neither block the Paris agreement nor assure its 
success. Countries must work together to bring this 
agreement into force or block it. This reality reflects 
the dispersion of power in the world system. That dis-
persion that is forcing nations to create new systems of 
governance that are more decentralized. It has also has 
removed the obvious leader (the United States) from 
its role as the planet’s only leader. In Paris, leadership 
came not just from American diplomats but also bil-
lionaire philanthropists who pledged more patient cap-
ital support for new technologies and leaders of pro-
gressive cities and states. Perhaps the most pivotal 
nation in making Paris feasible was China: a nation that 
has now become much more willing to engage with 
global agreements if they are framed in China-friendly 
ways. Leadership came, as well, from smaller entre-
preneurial countries—such as France that held the 
process together and Norway, which has done so much 
to fund new schemes to protect forests.  
To me, the 55% emissions threshold reveals that 
the Paris agreement, for all the hoopla, is far from a se-
rious scheme for deep international cooperation. It is a 
down payment on that system that is designed to 
come into force rapidly, and that’s the best that can be 
hoped for right now. In future agreements one of the 
quickest ways to assess the depth of the effort maybe 
to look at the entry into force provisions—if they are 
sophisticated and difficult to satisfy then they will re-
veal a real concern by countries for creating an agree-
ment that holds all its members accountable. Creating 
that kind of cooperation in a forum of nearly 200 coun-
tries will be hard, which is why most serious efforts are 
                                                                                           
Maenhour, Muntean and Peters (2015, p. 80). 
3 Numerically, the entry-into-force provisions for the Kyoto 
Protocol were identical (55%). However, there are two big dif-
ferences that determined why the Kyoto system created 
stronger veto rights for a small group of countries. Kyoto’s en-
try into force was calculated against a 1990 baseline when 
emissions were more highly concentrated around a few large 
countries—notably the U.S. and Soviet Union (Russia). And the 
Kyoto emission control (and entry-into-force) rules only ap-
plied to a core group of highly industrialized countries. Thus, de 
facto, two countries working together could block Kyoto: the 
U.S. and Russia.  
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still likely to come from smaller groups—such as the 
US-China bilateral process announced in November 
2014. We in the political science community along with 
scholars in international law should be working more 
on how these kinds of institutional designs intersect 
with countries’ willingness to cooperate. 
4. What Is Being Learned?  
Looking back at the last 25 years of research and di-
plomacy related to global climate governance is sober-
ing. For most of that time, the diplomatic efforts 
achieved very little. Moreover, the impact of systemat-
ic research about governance on the actual process of 
governance was tiny as well.  
Paris may mark a turning point in which some of 
the ideas about how to create more effective govern-
ance—such as ideas about the benefits of working in 
small groups, about the utility of flexible legal instru-
ments rather than just binding targets and timetables, 
and the ideas about how decentralized “polycentric” or 
“regime complex” systems function—are starting to 
have an impact.  
I see at least three sets of insights into the learning 
process that might be relevant as we in the academic 
community plan our next phases of research.  
First, at best, academics are just one set of actors in 
the broad contest to shape the choices about how to 
govern global problems. The history of climate change 
diplomacy suggests that our influence has been great-
est when the system is in shock—as happened in the 
aftermath of the spectacular failure of the 2009 Co-
penhagen Conference. Had that conference been seen 
as a success then the evolution from the older, inte-
grated and more top-down system of negotiating cli-
mate commitments might have been much slower. But 
failure animated a search for new ideas.  
Put differently, Copenhagen opened a “window of 
opportunity” that allowed entrepreneurs to combine 
the problem of inadequate governance with the 
stream of “solutions” coming from political science and 
other social sciences (Kingdon, 2011). But this shock 
did not erase the role of basic politics. Powerful coun-
tries needed to favor new models—as happened when 
China, the US, France and many others favored a more 
flexible pledge and review system.  
One implication of this first set of insights about 
“what is being learned” is that we must be patient. We 
in the academic community will develop dozens of ide-
as for improved governance. At best, only a few will be 
selected. Another implication is that the selection pro-
cess is something we should learn more about. My 
view is that we have under-appreciated the role of 
knowledge brokers inside governments and interna-
tional institutions—people who are trained in or well 
versed in the social science research yet have direct re-
sponsibilities for decisions (or at least how the prefer-
ences of their countries are articulated) that relate to 
institutional design.  
In this respect, there is an interesting disciplinary 
divide that may be muting our ability to have a greater 
impact. Most diplomats are lawyers. Yet despite an ef-
fort that is nearly thirty years old to promote commu-
nication between international law and the social sci-
ences the track record of that communication is 
erratic. There are periodic review papers on what 
scholars have learned in one discipline that might be 
relevant to the other (e.g., Hafner-Burton, Victor, & 
Lupu, 2012; Shaffer & Ginsburg, 2012). But we aren’t 
actually working well together, for the most part, and 
that probably has muted the impact of social science 
research on real world legal design. 
Second, we should have a debate within our field 
about why we weren’t more relevant during the first 
two decades of climate diplomacy. Back in the early 
1990s there was no shortage of diverse ideas about how 
the climate problem might be governed. But the ideas 
adopted by diplomats were deeply rooted in one model: 
the Montreal Protocol. Is this choice simply the power of 
the idea of “Montreal” or were there other forces at 
work? There is a big literature on the role of ideas in for-
eign policy (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Perhaps that 
literature can help us sort out the answers here.  
My candidate for the leading answer is that the 
groups that were best organized and most committed 
to advancing the cause of climate protection—the ma-
jor environmental NGOs (ENGOs) along with the Euro-
pean Union (EU)—were deeply committed to Montreal 
because it offered a clear example of a swift success. If 
so, this raises for us a big challenge in making the Paris 
model effective. There is a deep tension between the 
forces that are centrally motivated to address climate 
change and those that are willing to act on climate 
change if agreements are flexible and reflective on a 
broad array of other interests. The Underdalian insight in 
all of this—that is, the insight that is a bare bones reflec-
tion of the most important factor at work—is that the 
actors that are most highly motivated to make emission 
controls effective are a small and shrinking part of the 
global total while the countries whose own emission-
controlling behavior matters most are all less motivated.  
If this logic is right, then we need to learn how 
quickly the Paris process can be pushed without losing 
the support (and impact within) the countries that ac-
tually matter the most for solving the global problem. 
Ideally we would quantify that insight and share it with 
our colleagues in the climate modeling community so 
they can tell us more about the likely level of climate 
change that the real world will experience. I expect 
that likely real level of climate change will be a lot 
more than the aspirational goals set in Paris.  
If this logic is right, then we also need to learn more 
about what is motivating the skeptical actors to control 
their emissions. Most of that answer lies in “co-
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benefits” that tend to accompany climate policy. For 
example, a big shift from coal to gas or other clean 
fuels lowers emissions of warming gases but can also 
help control local pollution.  
Most social scientists working on this important 
problem want to find ways to help countries and EN-
GOs be more effective in pushing for deep global cuts 
in emissions. As part of that, we need to take a fresh 
look at how the rest of the world learns about what we 
do. Some of us have participated in the IPCC process, 
but that has been a clumsy way to get most insights 
from the social sciences into broader discussion be-
cause most of those insights are controversial and thus 
hard for the IPCC to synthesize.  
A third insight about what’s being learned concerns 
the right models for governance and expectations 
about rates of change. As noted above, I think the kind 
of model being developed here is similar to the “rounds” 
approach used in trade (Victor, 2011). Countries begin 
rounds with pledges and then stitch them together 
through lots of negotiations. That “rounds” process has 
become quite cumbersome as the membership of the 
GATT/WTO system has risen, which is a reminder that 
the basic “laws of numbers” about bargaining that Arild 
worked on decades ago still holds (Underdal, 1980). Big 
agreements are harder to reach than smaller ones—and 
the outcome will gravitate toward the least ambitious 
actor who is allowed in the room. Active tailoring of the 
“geometry” of the negotiations is needed.  
We as a community should probably help diplomats 
understand the practical implications of different mod-
els. When viewed from a distance it will be clear that 
the Paris agreement was actually relatively easy to 
reach. Most of the work was done in the last 6 
months—especially in the month or so prior to the 
conference and at many espresso-fueled meetings in 
the cloisters of the Paris conference center. Many of 
the disagreements in Paris were about process—
questions such as the timing and frequency for stock-
taking and fresh pledges, as well as language around 
the level of transparency and commitment—rather 
than substance, which was largely deflected through 
the pledge and review system. Most things that were 
hard to agree were set-aside for the future.  
I have always found it amazing that environmental 
diplomats think they can get a lot done over short pe-
riods of time. When you look at other areas where co-
operation is much deeper—like on economic matters 
and arms control—negotiation rounds run much longer 
and are more focused on substance. After Paris it will 
be very hard yet essential for diplomats to build the 
machinery that will make deeper cooperation possible 
in the future. 
5. Conclusion 
Over the last year there has been a lot written in antic-
ipation and assessment of Paris. Most of it is highly 
positive—correctly pointing to the possibility that Paris 
has turned a corner. Gone, perhaps, are the days when 
diplomats attended endless COP and other intergov-
ernmental meetings and make decisions that have little 
practical impact on the world.  
The next few years are crucial in determining 
whether Paris was a flash in the pan or a real shift to-
ward a more effective strategy. Too much attention 
has been focused on the agreement itself, a modest 
but useful 11-page document. More should concen-
trate on the 20-page detailed decision that was adopt-
ed alongside it and that outlines what countries should 
do once their diplomats get some sleep.  
I am optimistic that Paris has turned the corner. 
That optimism is an unusual sentiment for me since, 
for twenty years, I have written a lot about why serious 
climate cooperation is hard to achieve and why most of 
what’s been tried was bound to fail. Paris is different. 
That sobriety about what is possible has come from a 
few mentors, Arild notably among them, who have 
helped strip away all the complexity of international 
bargaining and focus on the core variables that explain 
most of the outcomes.  
The good news in Paris is that diplomats, led by the 
French, have now done the same thing. Success in 
making that new vision a reality is far from assured. It 
must be earned. Confidence in the process is rising, but 
it can easily shatter.  
For academics, there is a fresh opportunity to look 
closely at what the Paris process is trying to achieve 
and offer insights into how these new institutions can 
be designed and function. We were poised to do the 
same thing in the 1990s as the UNFCCC and then the 
Kyoto Protocol took shape, but the system was not in-
terested in much advice then. Today is different.  
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